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Extensive work has been done looking at how people reason causally and respond to 
information anomalous to their beliefs. However, little work has looked at how supportive and 
anomalous information interact when people evaluate the plausibility of a possible explanation. In this 
study, participants were given an event and either one or two possible explanations. Participants 
evaluated the plausibility of the explanation(s) repeatedly after exposure to combinations of 
supportive/non-supportive information and a strong/weak anomaly, producing a 2 (number of 
explanations) x 2 (presence of support) x 2 (strength of anomaly) design. The results showed that 
support initially increased plausibility and generally decreased the effect of anomalies. This was 
qualified by a 3-way interaction, which may be driven by how alternative explanations are evaluated 
relative to each other. The implications for future work, to understand how available information 
affects causal reasoning in everyday and professional contexts, are discussed. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
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viiiINTRODUCTION
“Scientific reasoning” calls to mind professionals in lab coats thinking carefully in their 
laboratories, but refers to everyday situations as well: a mechanic determining the problem with a car 
or an employer judging if an employee is late due to laziness or traffic would be examples. In fact, 
anytime conclusions are being produced based on data, or one explanation is being compared to 
another, the process of scientific reasoning is taking place. The study of scientific reasoning then gives 
us insight into both the processes we use to investigate the world and the conclusions people reach 
everyday, based on the information available to them. 
To date, most studies of scientific reasoning have been concerned with people's causal 
reasoning, or how people determine what causes something. 
Covariational and Mechanistic Causal Information
One particularly influential approach to scientific causal reasoning is based on the work of 
David Hume, who characterized the evaluation of causality as based on  “Humean indices” of priority, 
contiguity, and covariation(Koslowski, 1996; Proctor & Capaldi, 2006; Wilson & Keil, 1998). That is, 
the cause of an event must precede the event (priority), be present whenever the event occurs 
(contiguity), and changes in the cause must be associated with changes in the event (covariation). The 
use of such indices is quite appealing from a research perspective, both by being based on a number of 
concrete dimensions data and for appearing to be “theory independent”, or theoretically applicable to 
any given domain (Koslowski, 1996).
In studies that look at the use of Humean indices, covariational information is often presented in 
the form of statistical rates (Koerber, Sodian, Thoemer, Nett, 2005; Kuhn, D., Amsel, & O'Loughlin, 
11988), usually either ratios or percentages of the time the event and possible cause would covary. For 
example, in one study children generated a theory about which factors were causal and which were not, 
and then were given covariational information that either supported (confirmed) or undermined 
(disconfirmed) their theory. For example, one event was that children were getting sick and one factor 
the participants were given was whether the children ate chocolate cake or carrot cake (Kuhn, D., 
1989). If they said this factor (the type of cake) was not causal and were in the “disconfirm” condition, 
they would be shown pictures of children who had eaten chocolate cake getting sick and children who 
at carrot cake being healthy, visually depicting 100% correlation. Similarly, if the participants said the 
factor was causal and were in the disconfirm condition, they would be shown pictures of children who 
ate carrot cake getting sick and who ate chocolate cake getting sick, as well as both kinds of children 
being healthy, visually depicting 0% correlation between the factor and the outcome.
However, there are several drawbacks to the Humean indices approach. For example, much of 
the work that looks at reasoning based on Humean indices focuses on covariational information and 
then counts only responses based on this information as 'correct' (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Kuhn, D. , 
1989). This means that responses based on a child's own theory, are not scored as good reasoning. Even 
if the child proposed mechanism for how the event is or isn't linked to the factor, or cited previous 
experience that contradicts the presented information,  if the child doesn't base their answer on the 
presented information, it is not scored as proper reasoning. Some (Koslowski, 1996) have suggested 
this is an overly narrow view of scientific reasoning and the kinds of reasoning that are disregarded 
have an important place in scientific and everyday thinking. For example, some participants might offer 
reasons like “carrots are good for you, so carrot cake should be healthier.” When presented information 
that there is no covariation, if the participant disregards it, even if offering other factors that could have 
explained the results or saying it needed to be repeated, this is interpreted as persisting in a flawed 
theory in the face of contradictory evidence, which the researcher subsequently treats as being 
2unscientific. However, this kind of appeal to prior experience on the part of participants suggests that 
the evidence presented isn't strong enough to overcome this foundation, likely formed by personal 
experiences and information from parents, teachers and other 'experts'. “Neo humeans” and Bayesians 
even specifically address this concern by including prior experience in their models (Young, 1995). 
Studies of successful laboratories have also found that when experimental results are unexpected, the 
response is generally to repeat the experiment, assuming the result was due to a procedural error or 
other mistake, (Dunbar, 2000) rather than initially accepting the result and seeking a new explanation. 
It is only after repetition that the result is seen as valid and addressed, perhaps similarly to the children 
assuming other factors are behind the covariational results that are not consistent with their beliefs and 
theories. 
Additionally, others have highlighted the important role of non covariational information, such 
as information about possible mechanisms, or how a factor causes a given event (Ahn & Kalish, 1995; 
Koslowski 1996; Young, 1995; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2009). This mechanistic information may 
provide information about the world (which will be revisited later) or may specifically address possible 
causal chains or processes that lead to the event of interest. In fact, the ubiquity of covariations in the 
world makes it necessary to filter which covariations are even considered plausible candidates for 
causing the event in question (Quine, 1969). Mechanistic information, which conveys not how often 
something happens but how it can happen, has been proposed to play a role in filtering candidates and 
interpreting which covariations are actually meaningful.
One of Koslowski’s experiments (1996) illustrates the interaction of mechanistic and 
covariational information. In the study, some participants were told that the only difference between 
two cars with different gas mileage was the color that the cars were painted. These participants were 
less likely to believe that color was causal than they were to believe a more plausible factor, such as 
how new the factory was that had made the cars. Even though the covariation evidence for those factors 
3was the same, participants were less likely to see the paint color as causal because they had no 
mechanism for how the paint color might affect the gas mileage. However, when participants were 
supplied with such a mechanism (color might affect driver behavior, such as red making them more 
alert and better driver, and this behavioral change would affect mileage) they were then more likely to 
rate color as causal.  This example highlights the filtering role of mechanistic information; when 
participants lacked a plausible mechanism, they tended to disregard the covariational information while 
those with a mechanism were more likely to be influenced by the same  covariational information.
Another reason offered for the importance of mechanistic information is that covariational 
evidence is not always available (Koslowski, 1996). If an event is historical, or a unique occurrence, 
there won’t be enough information to form a covariational account, but mechanistic information about 
the factors that caused the event may be available. In everyday instances as well, some findings suggest 
that people may be more comfortable dealing with mechanistic information than rates of covariation. 
This can be seen in rationales participants provide, which typically reference mechanistic arguments 
even when asked about covariational information (Koslowski, 1996; Kuhn, D., 1989) and particularly 
in studies in which participants are asked to convince others that a certain explanation is correct. In 
such studies participants almost exclusively suggested mechanistic arguments rather than statistical 
appeals (Ahn & Kalish, 1995; Brem & Rips, 2000; Kuhn, D., 1989). While mechanistic reasoning may 
or may not be a sound or appropriate form or reasoning, these findings demonstrate that it is a kind of 
reasoning that people regularly use; in order to understand how people reason about problems, one 
must have some understanding of mechanistic reasoning.
Anomalous Information
No explanation is perfect. There will be information that is problematic for the explanation, and 
this type of information is called an anomaly. It can be an unexpected finding or a piece of information 
4that is difficult to explain within one's current framework.  An anomaly does not necessarily contradict 
the explanation, though it can; rather, anomalies are just information that does not easily fit into the 
current explanation. T.S. Kuhn (1962), noted the central role of anomalies in bringing about a paradigm 
shift; because no theory is perfect, anomalies to that theory will emerge over time.  It is through the 
process of exploring these inconsistencies and refining one's theory until the findings that were 
anomalies are expected results that a paradigm shift occurs. 
It is important to note that anomalies are very clearly defined if one only considers things purely 
from a covariational perspective: An anomaly is either a failure of the possible cause and event to 
covary when the covariation is expected, or a clear covariation when the covariation is not expected. 
The examples of undermining covariational information discussed  previously (i.e. children getting sick 
or not after eating cake) would be examples of such anomalies.
However, Koslowski has suggested that defining what information is or isn't  anomalous is 
much more difficult if one takes a broader perspective that considers mechanistic as well as 
covariational information. Since mechanisms are based on beliefs about how the world works, types of 
information other than a failure to covary can be problematic. For instance, the previously discussed 
covariational anomalies are still problematic from this broader perspective (ie children getting sick 
after eating cake), but now information that relates to beliefs about the mechanism (what makes one 
sick, what makes one healthy) could be anomalous as well.  It is often more difficult to evaluate how 
these other types of information affect the plausibility of a theory than it is to analyze the impact of an 
observed covariation. In this perspective information may even be ambiguous, and whether the 
information is anomalous depends on how it is integrated with one's already present beliefs and 
information. This makes identifying anomalies much less straightforward in the broader perspective 
than in one that only considers covariational information.
One strategy in dealing with these complexities is referred to as Inference to the Best 
5Explanation (IBE). A more in depth treatment of this approach has been done by Lipton (2004) but to 
summarize: The general approach is to evaluate which of the plausible available explanations best fits 
the available information, is consistent with well established background beliefs, and best fits a number 
of explanatory dimensions. These dimensions include scope (how broad a category of phenomena the 
explanation applies to), precision (how accurately it reflects the information), and simplicity (how 
many assumptions must be made). Lipton argues it is not about which explanation is the most likely, 
but which is “loveliest” in terms of balancing the concerns of these dimensions and fitting the evidence. 
Some have argued that this model better fits actual scientific process and everyday causal reasoning 
( Lipton, 2004; Magnani, 2001; Proctor & Capaldi, 2006; Thagard, 1989) than other models, such as 
hypothetico deductive reasoning, or Popperian falsification. 
One important implication of this model is that an explanation is evaluated on how well it fits 
the information available, which is not limited to information in a particular domain. In the classic 
example from the history of science, one reason natural selection was so compelling was not just that it 
explained differentiation arguably as well as other theories (such as divine intervention), but that it 
explained differentiation in a way that was consistent with cell theory, and tectonic shifts, etc. Another 
reason was its predictive power, as it could make predictions about how a population that is isolated in 
new conditions for long periods of time will diverge from its parent population. 
This example also demonstrates the importance of context in evaluating explanations: in IBE, 
the explanation is evaluated with respect to the available alternative explanations, not in a vacuum or 
in an absolute sense. This key aspect of reasoning will be revisited later.
As an elaborated framework of how to evaluate a theory, IBE also provides a way to evaluate 
which information is problematic and how that information is problematic. That is, since IBE details a 
way to evaluate a theory it also allows us describe how that evaluation changes in response to new 
information. If a theory would be “less lovely” when a piece of information is available than when that 
6piece is not, such a change in the evaluation can be used as a measure of how anomalous that piece of 
information is to that theory. This makes IBE useful for the previously mentioned difficulty of defining 
what information is problematic for theories when one considers mechanistic information in addition to 
covariational information. IBE provides a system and framework to evaluate how problematic a piece 
of information is in the broader perspective and exactly why it is problematic.
Past Work on Anomalous Information
Turning from abstract reasoning to more concrete questions, previous work has also asked “how 
do people respond when presented with anomalies?” Chinn and Brewer (1993; 1998) have generated 
and attempted to empirically test a framework of the various ways in which people respond to 
anomalies, including shifting from a held explanation to an alternative theory. To summarize, the 
authors detailed eight possible responses to anomalies, six of which may be generally grouped into 
dismissing the information or making it less problematic, and while the remaining two are making 
peripheral changes to the theory and actually changing which theory they believe. These results may 
indicate something about how resistant most participants are to changing their evaluations of a theory 
in response to an anomaly.  
Chinn and Brewer's work provides a picture of possible response to anomalies, but was not 
designed to look at what factors lead to individual differences in these responses. Their studies 
presented participants with theories and anomalies to those theories, then looked for common structures 
in the responses. This was done to develop (and later test the completeness of) their taxonomy of 
responses, but neglected to more thoroughly examine their anomalies. If there is meaningful variation 
in the anomalies, this could be an important factor in how people will respond to it, and research 
exploring possible distinctions between anomalies has found some interesting results. Koslowski, 
Libby, O’Connor, Rush, and Golub, (in prep) have looked at what makes some anomalies “stronger” or 
7more compelling than other anomalies; for example, if you have the theory “penicillin kills germs” then 
experimental results showing “penicillin makes germs grow” will be a stronger anomaly than 
“penicillin only kills some germs”(Koslowski, 1996). What little work has been done on the topic 
(Koslowski et al., in prep) has shown that people can generate approximately the same number of 
reconciliations for both strong and weak anomalies, finding some way to account for the problematic 
information while maintaining a held theory. When participants are asked to rate the plausibility of 
resolutions they have generated, however, they tend to rate the reconciliations for strong anomalies as 
much less plausible than the reconciliations they have generated for weak anomalies. One interpretation 
of these findings is that there is always a way to account for an anomaly, after the fact, but strong 
anomalies are hard to account for in a plausible way; in other words, you can always say aliens did it, 
but this is rarely satisfying. This inability to resolve the anomaly in a satisfying, plausible way may be 
part of why strong anomalies are more problematic.
Although important, this work did not explicitly examine the role of background information in 
dealing with anomalies, though; The amount and content of previous experience should play an 
important role in whether an anomaly is seen as a trivial oddity or as a significant problem for a theory 
(Koslowski, 1996; Kuhn, D., 1989). If all one’s life balls fall down when dropped and suddenly one 
falls up, the expected response is not a diminished belief in gravity, but an inspection of the ball or an 
assertion that some other factors    magnets or fishing line perhaps    were at play. This is an extreme 
example of how past experience can influence response to an anomaly, but it serves to demonstrate 
how large a role such knowledge can play in dealing with new, anomalous information. 
One way experience may have such an effect is because it acts not just on the explanation of 
interest but also on a number related beliefs. That is, the theory being undermined is part of what Quine 
and Ullian (1978) termed a network of related beliefs that support each other and make it more difficult 
to convince people of another explanation. Swiderek (1999) explored this by taking a  large, central 
8belief of the participants and presenting evidence that disconfirmed subsidiary beliefs that related to the 
central belief. In this case, the central belief was one’s opinion on capital punishment and the subsidiary 
beliefs were factors such as how effective a deterrent it is, the economic impact, and how likely it is 
that there are wrongful convictions. She found that the sum of the change in the subsidiary beliefs 
predicted 85% of the variance of the change in the central belief about capital punishment in 
subsequent interviews, demonstrating the impact these related beliefs can have on each other.
Some feel that the large role of background knowledge in responding to new information can be 
a detriment to reasoning. For example, ‘confirmation bias’ or a  tendency to discard or misinterpret 
information that does not support one’s held theory, can frequently lead to errors in scientific reasoning 
(Nickerson, 1998).  While such a bias can certainly be seen as flawed reasoning in some instances, such 
as, for example, the persistence in the belief the earth is flat, in other cases it is a reasonable response. 
To revisit the previous example of a ball falling up, in this case, looking for an alternate explanation 
that preserves the theory of gravity, while it may be confirmation bias, can be seen as good reasoning. 
The reluctance to accept information that contradicts beliefs that are based on numerous past 
experiences, are consistent with other knowledge of the world, and are well integrated with what else 
one knows about the world, is not poor reasoning. Studies of productive labs (Dunbar, 2000) have also 
found this kind of skepticism is quite prevalent; as already noted, researchers tend to replicate 
unexpected findings repeatedly to eliminate other possible causes before considering how the new 
finding could impact their theories. 
The Current Investigation
While some work has investigated the effects of background information and anomalous 
information on theory change, little work has directly attempted to manipulate both factors to examine 
the interaction. Is it simply that background support makes people less likely to change their view in 
9response to both strong and weak anomalies? Does such background support change the impact 
anomalies make differently based on the strength of the anomalies? Does support change anomalies 
effects in different ways if other explanations are present than if they are not?
To address these questions, the current experiment was designed to manipulate the supportive 
information available, the strength of the anomaly, and the presence of an alternative explanation. 
Background knowledge is difficult to manipulate, and work using such manipulations has typically 
employed quasi experimental designs using experts and novices in a given field (Hmelo Silver & 
Pfeffer, 2004 ; Schauble, Glaser, Raghavan, & Reiner, 1991), with the assumption that experts bring 
more background knowledge and relevant previous experiences to the experimental situation than 
novices.  However, the current investigation attempts to manipulate the information available to 
participants directly: some participants were given background information that supported an 
explanation and then given an anomaly while others are simply given the same anomaly without the 
preceding background information. While the effect of supporting information may be weaker than the 
effect of the more elaborate background knowledge of an expert, this approach was selected because it 
allowed us to directly manipulate the presence of supportive information. Such an approach also 
controls for the amount of support, as each participant can receive the exact same information (as 
opposed to the varying experiences of experts).  A two step process, presenting the participants with the 
supportive information then presenting them with the anomaly, was used; this way the participants had 
the support and then encountered the anomaly, as one with background experience would. 
10METHODS
Participants
Participants were 65 Cornell University undergraduates (32 male, 33 female) between the ages 
of 18 and 23 (M = 19.95, SD= 1.11 ) recruited through a university website. They were interviewed 
during the Fall 2009 and Spring 2010 terms and compensated for their time.
Materials
Stories: Six stories were used which each consisted of  an event to be explained, two possible 
explanations for the event, supportive information, and two anomalies. The content of these stories 
varied from explaining biological phenomena (fish dying in an area, the changing height of 
populations) to explaining cultural practices (differences in ancient burial customs, rising age of 
marriage, religious conversion) or events that could be either (differences in the success rates of 
surgery). The full stories are included in Appendix A. 
The stories were selected to be in generally familiar domains, but employed largely unfamiliar 
specifics; this was to allow the participants enough familiarity to intelligently reason about the 
explanation, but little relevant experience, such that the presented information would likely be novel for 
all the participants. 
Design
A 2 (alternative present vs. absent) x 2 (supportive information presence vs. absence) x 2 
(anomaly strength: strong vs. weak) design was used. It is important to note that anomaly strength was 
a within subjects variable, while alternative and supportive information presence were between 
11subjects variables. That is all six of the stories that a given participant received either had alternatives 
(alternative present condition) or else did not (alternative absent condition) because presenting an 
alternative in one story might have primed the participant to expect or to generate their own alternatives 
in subsequent stories that did not explicitly present them with an alternative. This would have made the 
results more difficult to interpret. There was a similar concern regarding the presence of supportive 
information so it was made a between subjects variable.  However, since all participants received 
anomalies, this was not a concern for that variable; it did not matter if previous stories prompted them 
to think there would be anomalies, because there always were anomalies. Participants were thus 
randomly assigned to one of 4 conditions (alternative present/absent x support present/absent), and 
received all six stories in random order. Half the stories received by each subject had strong anomalies 
and half had weak anomalies.
Anomaly strength was made a within subjects variable to address concerns about expectation 
and bias. Pilot studies raised concerns that if participants received all strong anomalies, they would 
anticipate problematic information coming and either reduce initial ratings or not fully read anomalies, 
and assume they were very problematic. This concern was addressed by giving participants both strong 
and weak anomalies in random order; participants would have to think about the implications of each 
piece of information, rather than sensing a pattern.
The additional information (both supportive and anomalous) was selected for its relationship to 
the target explanation. When the additional information is referred to as supportive or anomalous, this 
refers to it in relation to the target explanation not the alternative explanation or to both explanations. 
As much as possible, the additional information was intended to be neutral toward the alternative 
explanation. This allowed us to better compare results  across the alternative present and alternative 
absent groups (since the “target explanation” is the explanation that was present in both conditions). 
Information could be considered anomalous to the target if it supported  an alternative explanation (as 
12discussed in Chinn and Brewer, 2001),  but this creates issues of comparison when there is no 
alternative both because it is not there to be supported by this and because the information might 
suggest the alternative to the participant even if they would not otherwise have generated it. Therefore, 
for this task the anomalous information, as much as possible, only applied to the target and was neutral 
to the alternative.
The supportive information provided support by either presenting a possible mechanism for the 
theory to lead to the event (as in stories 1 & 5)  or by providing information that would be expected if 
the theory was true, but did not provide conclusive evidence (stories 2, 3, 4, 6) and the support used is 
available in Appendix A. These kinds of information were used in an attempt to introduce related 
beliefs that could support the target explanation without making the explanation too strong to be 
affected by the anomalies.
Procedure
After signing the consent form, the participants were presented (shown and read by the 
experimenter) an event (e.g. coastal fish dying), as well as an explanation for the event (e.g. invasive 
species are killing them; referred to as the target explanation). They were then asked for both an initial 
(Time 1) rating of the plausibility of the target explanation and a rationale of why they chose that 
rating. Their ratings of plausibility were on a 1 (“not at all convincing”) to 11 (“completely 
convincing”) point Likert scale (Appendix B). Half the participants were also presented with a second 
possible explanation (referred to as the alternative) for the event as well as the target. The alternative 
was also rated each time the target was rated. 
After the initial rating(s), half the participants were given additional information that supported 
the target explanation (such as: Invasive species are dangerous because native species have never 
encountered them before. They may produce substances that are very harmful to creatures).  The others 
13participants were told that researchers had not yet had a chance to search for additional information. 
All participants were then asked to rerate the explanation(s) (Time 2 ratings).
Finally, the participants were all given information that was problematic for (anomalous to) the 
target explanation and asked to rerate the explanation(s) (Time 3). However the strength  of the 
anomalies was varied, so that some information was more problematic for the target than others (which 
anomalies were strong and weak was determined by pilot testing or previous studies).  Half of the 
participants in each previous group (those who received support and those who did not) received 
“strong anomalies” which were very problematic for the target, while the other half received “weak 
anomalies” which were still problematic, but easier to reconcile with the explanation or resolve than the 
strong anomalies. 
This procedure was then repeated for the other five stories.
An example of a full protocol has been included in Appendix B.
14RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For reasons previously discussed, the following analyses were done on the participants' ratings 
of the target explanation or on the changes in ratings of the target explanation between one time point 
and the next. Each of the analyses used a mixed linear model run in a PSAW statistical package.  The 
effects of the presence of alternative, the presence of support, the strength of the anomaly, the story 
type (types 1 6), and the gender of the participant were included in the model as fixed effects. The 
subject was included as a random effect. Each of the final models only included interactions that were 
significant. In the first analysis of differences scores (Time 1 to Time 2), the rating at Time 1 was 
included as an additional fixed effect; in the second analysis (Time 2 to Time 3) rating at Time 2 was 
included instead. 
Overview
A general overview of the participants ratings over time is given in Figure 1. This figure 
displays the average ratings when given the initial explanation(s) (Time 1), after being given the 
supportive information or not (Time 2), and after receiving the anomaly (Time 3). In this overview, 
there are a few clear results which will be discussed in more detail subsequently: For participants who 
received support (represented by the 4 solid lines) ratings of plausibility of the target explanation went 
up (from Time 1 to Time 2), while for those that did not receive support (represented by the 4 dotted 
lines) remained approximately the same  during the same period. Additionally, we can see that the 
ratings decreased in all groups after the participants were presented with an anomaly (Time 3). These 
results show the basic manipulations were effective, but the more interesting part of the results are the 
variation in the slopes between Time 2 and Time 3, as this suggests there are interactions, which will be 
explored in more depth later.
15Figure 1; Overview of participants' ratings of the target explanation across conditions and time
Initial Ratings
At Time 1, initial ratings of the target explanation showed no significant differences among any 
conditions. The only significant effect was of story content (F(4,254=11.699, P < .001), with stories 1 
and 4 (involving medical care and marriage age respectively) having slightly higher initial ratings of 
the target explanation than other stories. Story type, however, did not interact with any of the other 
variables at any of the timepoints and the effect of story type was included in subsequent models, so it 
could be partialled out.
16Effect of Supportive Information
Difference scores between the ratings at Time 1 and Time 2 were used as the response measure 
in order to look at how ratings of the target changed when support was presented between the ratings at 
Time 1 and  Time 2. The main effects of support presence (F(1,352)=42.238, P<.001) and the initial 
target rating at Time 1 (F(1,370)=12.550, P<.001) were qualified by an interaction of the two (F(1, 
372)=14.042, P < .001).  The estimated fixed effect of this interaction showed a negative relationship 
between presence of support and  the initial target rating at Time 1. That is, 
 those who initially rated the target as more plausible at Time 1 responded less to the supportive 
information (ie did not increase their ratings as much at Time 2). This result may have been due to a 
ceiling effect.
One possible explanation for this interaction is that participants who initially rated the target as 
more plausible did so based on supportive information that was available to them based on prior 
experience, so the presented supportive information had either already been considered in the initial 
rating or was redundant with the information that had been considered. In contrast those who initially 
rated the target as less plausible may have had less background knowledge that was supportive of the 
target explanation or relevant to the story. Therefore the supportive information may have been 
particularly novel for these participants. This account is consistent with the some of the rationales that 
were collected; participants who initially rated the target more plausible responded to the support with 
“that's what I just said” and similarly, participants who had initially rated the target less plausible 
responded to the support with “I hadn't thought of that”.
Effect of Anomaly Strength
Difference scores between the ratings at Time 2 and Time 3 were then used to examine how the 
17ratings changed when the anomalies were presented. There was a 3 way interaction between the 
presence of an alternative explanation, the presence of supportive information, and the strength of the 
anomaly (F(1,312)=4.604, P < .05). The difference scores for the different conditions are shown in 
Figure 2 (in contrast to the mean scores of Figure 1).  To better understand the 3 way interaction, the 
conditions were broken down for additional analyses. Looking only at the subjects who did not receive 
support (the first four bars in Figure 2, from the left to right), the only significant main effect was the 
anomaly strength (F(1, 122)=6.640, P <.05); when there was no supportive information, the presence of 
an alternative explanation did not significantly affect ratings. When supportive information was 
present, however, (the other four bars in Figure 2), there was a  significant interaction of alternative 
presence and anomaly strength (F(1, 125)=8.302, P<.005) such that the strong anomaly had a larger 
effect when no alternative explanation present.
The 3 way interaction also qualified a main effect of anomaly strength (F(1, 208)=4.497, 
P<.05). The presence of an alternative explanation and the presence of support did not have significant 
main effects in the full, final model.  The rating at Time 2 was included in the model, and had a main 
effect (F(10, 214)=3.185, P<.001) but no significant interactions.
18Figure 2; Mean differences in ratings from Time 2 3 for all conditions   
To summarize, when there was no support, strong anomalies decreased target plausibility more 
than weak anomalies. The presence of an alternative explanation had no effect on this decrease. Thus it 
appears that when there was no supportive information reinforcing the target's plausibility, anomalies 
made the target less plausible regardless of the presence of an alternative. It is not surprising that when 
there was no alternative present the anomaly was seen as a weakness or flaw in the target. When there 
was an alternative, but no additional support to distinguish the target from the alternative, the anomaly 
19was still a flaw in the target and had the same effect.
When support for the target was present, the effect of the anomaly depended on both its strength 
and whether an alternative was present. Weak anomalies reduced the plausibility of the target less when 
supportive information was present than when it was absent (t(170)= 2.201, P<.05). It appears that 
supportive information made the target more resistant to weak anomalies. The effect of support on 
strong anomalies interacts with the presence of an alternative however, and this may be due to a 
framing effect. 
When support for the target was present and there was an alternative available, the effect of the 
strong anomaly was reduced to the point it did not significantly differ from the effect of the weak 
anomaly when support was present (t(75.4)=.659, P=n.s.), yet when there was support present but no 
alternative the strong anomaly had a substantial effect on the target's plausibility. It may be that the 
reason for this discrepancy is that having an alternative influenced how the participants rated the 
target's plausibility. For example, when there was an alternative present it was clear that there were 
other possible explanations in addition to the target. Although the anomaly was a problem for the target 
and not the alternative, participants may have thought that there were probably anomalies to the 
alternative that were simply not available to them yet. They did not know if there were also anomalies 
to the presented alternative, if there were other alternatives, or if those explanations were better or 
worse than the currently presented explanations. If participants had this mindset, the strong anomaly 
may not have reduced the plausibility of the target as much because while it was a problem for the 
target, it did not reduce the plausibility of the target much compared to the plausibility of alternative 
explanations. In contrast, when there was support available but no alternative, the target appears to be 
the only viable explanation; the supportive information reinforces this by making the target seem even 
more plausible. The strong anomaly is still problematic for the target however, and on an 
approximation of an absolute scale makes the target much less plausible.
20It may be that the presence of an alternative altered how the participants evaluated  the 
plausibility of the target rather than affecting the response to the anomaly. The presence of the 
alternative cued participants to rate the target's plausibility relative to alternatives, while the absence of 
an alternative left them to rate the target on more of an “absolute scale of plausibility”. Thus 
participants given an alternative changed their rating little in response to the strong anomaly, because 
all explanations have problems. However, participants without an alternative changed their ratings 
more in response because the anomaly was in fact very problematic for the target. 
Change from initial to final rating
Difference scores from Time 1 to Time 3 were also analyzed, to look at the total change in 
ratings. These results are shown in Figure 3, which is in the same format as Figure 2. In fact, since 
there was no significant change from Time 1 to Time 2 when no support was presented, as discussed 
previously, the only difference between Figures 2 and 3 should be in the conditions where support was 
presented.
Statistically, there were strong main effects of  anomaly strength (F(1, 304)=8.689, P<.005) and 
the presence of support (F(1, 184)=12.811, P<.001), but not of alternative presence, and there were no 
significant interactions between them. There was a significant interaction between the presence of 
support and the initial rating at Time 1 (F(9, 340)=2.308, P<.05), but this was already discussed under 
“Effect of supportive information”. It seems odd that the 3 way interaction from Time 2 3 does not 
appear here, but that may be due to the combination of higher variability in responses for this analysis 
withthe large number of conditions relative to n.
21Figure 3; Mean differences in ratings from Time 1 3 for all conditions  
However, considering these results as the sum of the component changes from Time 1 to Time 2 
and from Time 2 to Time 3 provides a much clearer picture of the interaction of supportive and 
anomalous information. Supportive information first bolsters the plausibility of the target (the increase 
from Time 1 2) and then reduces the effect of the anomaly (from Time 2 3), and the sum of these 
effects almost completely cancels the effect of the anomaly when an alternative was present. It appears 
that when alternative explanations are present, as is very often the case, supportive information could 
be said to inoculate one against the effects of anomalous information. However, there are some cases, 
such as when there are no available alternatives and the anomaly is particularly strong, that an anomaly 
can still overcome these effects and reduce an explanation's plausibility.
22GENERAL DISCUSSION
There are other possible explanations for the 3 way interaction between Times 2 and 3:
One possible explanation is its simply a response to the complexity of the stimuli. The 
participants who received support and an alternative received the most information to keep track of out 
of all the participants. Though they did not have to memorize the information (they could freely refer 
back to all the information presented), simply keeping track of how it related to the presented 
explanations and to their background knowledge created greater task demands. When they were then 
presented with a weak anomaly, they considered it problematic, but its effect was attenuated by the 
supportive information. The strong anomaly would have been more difficult to reconcile with what 
they had been previously given, however. It may be that rather than dealing with this difficulty they 
held the anomaly in abeyance. With the demands on them, it could be that they just registered that it 
was a problem, which could explain why the strong anomaly's effect was equivalent to a weak 
anomaly.
Reviewing the rationales provides some support for this type of explanation. The rationales do 
show deep processing but it is combined with a confusion about how to integrate the anomaly into the 
participant's current understanding. The participants have been relating the support and their own 
background knowledge to the two presented explanations, and the new information from the strong 
anomaly is not easily integrated; they know it is relevant, but are unsure how to make sense of it, and 
some participants explicitly question its validity. Knowing the anomaly is a problem, but unsure how to 
respond, they simply note that it is a problem, treat it as a weak anomaly, and maintain their current 
understanding as best they can. It is not that they don't know its a problem; it is that they don't know 
what to do about it. 
23Another possible explanation is that when an alternative was present, participants saw the target 
explanation as part of a larger compound explanation, which is less affected by the strong anomaly. 
Koslowski (2010) has suggested that having a non mutually exclusive alternative present may cue 
participants that multiple factors could be causing the event, and the target explanation is only one of 
them. While the strong anomaly may be problematic for an explanation with the target as the sole 
causal factor, some participants responded with rationalizations in the form of “its not as important, but 
still a factor” indicating that they believed the target explanation was still part of a larger explanation 
but played a less central role in causing the event. If they see the strong anomaly as only undermining 
part of this larger explanation, it may explain why the strong anomaly has less impact and is treated as 
weak anomaly when an alternative is present. 
Future Directions
One question related to these findings is whether only new information affects ratings of 
explanation plausibility or if activating background knowledge explicitly could cause participants to 
change from an initial rating. That is, does only new supportive information inoculate one against 
anomalies, does previously learned information have as strong an effect as novel information, and does 
reminding subjects of previously learned information cause it to have more of an effect. This would 
likely vary based on how deeply the participant originally considered the explanation; some 
participants would try to apply all their relevant background knowledge initially and thus have little 
reason to change their ratings after such a manipulation. Perhaps more interesting then would be 
explicitly asking them to generate support for an explanation before being presented with an anomaly 
and measuring if this attenuates the effect of anomalies in the same way as presenting new supportive 
information. 
Another questions is what other conditions are relevant to determining when anomalies 
24overcome supportive information. What factors other than the availability of plausible alternative 
explanations and the strength of the anomaly might play a role? Do these factors differ between novices 
that have a less developed understanding of the support than experts with more entrenched and 
interconnected concepts? As previously discussed, work with experts finds them more resistant to 
anomalies, and the effect of support discussed could play a role in explaining that. However, “resistant” 
means that change still occurs sometimes; closely examining when anomalies have an effect and if the 
factors relevant to an anomaly's impact on expert reasoning have a similar impact on everyday 
reasoning could be quite informative. 
In addition, the rationales given by participants suggest more work needs to be done on when 
and how people reason using compound explanations composed of multiple causal agents to explain an 
event. Some work on compound explanations has been done in looking at the differences between 
experts and novices (Schauble, Glaser, Raghavan, & Reiner, 1991; Hmelo Silver & Pfeffer, 2004) or in 
more computational environments (Krems & Johnson, 1995) but little has been done on their role in 
everyday reasoning. Looking at when non experts use compound explanations, how they use them, and 
how these more complex explanations respond to supportive and anomalous information could give us 
an even more complete picture of how people reason about events in the real world.
Conclusion
Comparing explanations is nearly ubiquitous and this work shows that not only is it affected by 
many factors, but that sometimes the interactions of basic factors can be counter intuitive. How people 
evaluate explanations is not only affected by what information is available and what alternatives are 
available, but the alternatives can significantly change the impact of that information. Continued work 
to expand our understanding of how the information available to people affects their beliefs and their 
responses to subsequent information is needed to better understand this complex process. Such work 
25has great potential impact, as a better understanding of how people choose between possible 
explanations allows us to correct for possible biases: If doctors generally attend one type of information 
over another, compensating for this kind of bias could be critical.  In schools, knowing how new 
information interacts with previous experience could allow teachers to more effectively convey how or 
why things work to students. This kind of insight is particularly useful in science education, where 
current methods take great effort to convey fundamental concepts.  Finally, evaluating explanations is 
at the core of scientific inquiry; a better understanding of how people reason should help researchers 
reason better about their own findings.
26APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Story Content
Story 1:
Event:
When doing complicated and innovative surgeries (such as transplants, etc.), some hospitals 
clearly have a better success rate than others, even if the patients and procedures are 
comparable. 
Possible Explanation:
(One) possible explanation is that successful hospitals have attracted surgeons and surgical 
nurses who are especially skilled and well educated. 
Alternative:
(Another) possible explanation is that in successful hospitals each surgeon works with a 
particular group of surgical nurses, so that surgeon and nurses learn to work together as a 
standard team. 
Support:
Surgeons and nurses with better skills and education have a better understanding  of 
procedures and are more capable of anticipating possible complications to the success of an 
operation.
Anomalies:
Weak:
27The success rates of many hospitals remain poor even after most of their surgeons have 
received training and practice in complicated surgical procedures.
Strong:
Some of the hospitals with the worst success rates have poor success rates  even when 
they recruit especially skilled surgeons from other high performing hospitals.
Story 2
Event:
Over the past fifty years or so, there has been a documented decrease in the average height of 
Americans, while Europeans have, on average, gotten taller.  This difference is found even if 
one excludes recent immigrants. 
Possible explanation:
One hypothesis is that the increasing popularity of “junk food” in the United States has led to a 
general decline in nutrition (reduced vitamins and micronutrients).  This, in turn, has caused 
people not to grow to their full height potential.
Alternative:
One hypothesis is that there has come to be a growing percentage of people in the U.S. that 
receives little or no health care.  People with no health care are more susceptible to various 
infections, which they transmit even to people who do have health care. This reduces the 
growth potential of everyone.
Support:
The past fifty years have also seen an increase in the number of snack and candy vending 
28machines in the United States.
Anomalies:
Weak:
The height differences occur even though a larger percentage of people in the U.S. than in 
Europe take vitamins to compensate for nutritional deficiencies.  
Strong:
The decrease in average height in the U.S. is found even when the population is divided into 
individual groups based on income, education, race, or ethnic origin.  That is, the decrease in 
average height is found in each individual group, even in the groups that one would expect eat 
very little junk food. 
Story 3
Event:
Prehistoric sites in Eurasia have found the graves of several women from a nomadic, herding 
tribe.  One group of women was buried with swords, daggers, and bows and arrows, while 
another was buried with jewelry and luxury items. Why was one group buried with weapons? 
Possible explanation:
This group of women actually fought alongside the men (for example, to help protect their 
herds from raiding parties) and they were buried with the weapons they had used in life.
Alternative:
This group of women was buried with these weapons as part of a symbolic ritual, to insure 
safety and protection in the afterlife.
29Support:
Women buried with weapons had bowed legs, which often results from riding horses.
Anomalies:
Weak:
Most of the men had signs of some injuries, such as places where minor fractures had occurred 
and healed, but few of the women did, regardless of what they were buried with.
Strong:
Anthropologists have found evidence that the tribe had strong religious taboos against women 
fighting or hunting.
Story 4
Event:
The average age at which American women choose to get married for the first time has been 
increasing over the past few decades.
Possible explanation:
One possible explanation is that more women are pursuing advanced degrees after college and 
this means additional time spent in school. The suggestion is that women are delaying marriage 
because they are pursuing advanced degrees.
Alternative:
One possible explanation is that, since the 1960’s, there has been a decreased negative stigma 
attached to couples who live together before marriage. Women are marrying later because they 
30are choosing instead to live with their partners before they get married.
Support:
More women are achieving high positions in their chosen fields.
Anomalies:
Weak:
Some women are getting married while in their professional programs, not delaying it until they 
finish.
Strong:
The increase in marriage age is observed across economic status and education levels. 
Story 5:
Event:
Over the past few years, there has been an increase in the rate at which fish are dying in the 
waters off the east coast of Central America.
Possible explanation:
The amount of invasive algae (plant like organisms) has been increasing in the coastal waters. 
On this view, toxins produced by the algae have been killing the fish.
Alternative: 
The number of hurricanes and other violent storms in the area has been increasing and the 
strong winds have been affecting ocean currents.  On this view, the rapidly changing ocean 
currents have churned up the water and disrupted the food supply of the area.
31Support:
Invasive species are dangerous because native species have never encountered them before. 
While other creatures in a species natural environment have adapted to them, they may produce 
substances that are very harmful to creatures in other environments.
Anomalies:
Weak:
Swimmers visiting the coastline have shown no change in health.
Strong:
Large sea mammals that also live in these coastal waters have shown no change in health.
Story 6
Event:
When Rome conquered various parts of the world (such as Britain or Gaul), the indigenous 
people swiftly adopted Roman gods and began to celebrate Roman religious holidays.  
Possible explanation:
It was simply a matter of force; the Roman Empire forced the conquered people to adopt their 
gods and religions or else suffer retaliation.
Alternative:
The Romans had an extensive network of trade. The indigenous people adopted the Roman 
religion for economic reasons, that is, to have better access to the wealth and goods that could 
result from joining the Romans in trade.
32Support:
There is evidence that several sites of indigenous worship (such as temples) were destroyed by 
invading Roman armies.
Anomalies:
Weak:
Some Roman administrators themselves adopted the gods of the conquered people and suffered 
no punishment from their superiors.
Strong:
Records show that even when their children were seriously ill, the indigenous people would 
pray to the Roman gods, rather than the indigenous gods, for their child’s health.
33APPENDIX B: Full protocol
(Note: This protocol is for Story 1 and presents the target, then the alternative, no support, and a 
strong anomaly.)
Today's date: DOB: M F
C 4
St 1 T + Alt no sup T an str
Event:
When doing complicated and innovative surgeries (such as transplants, etc.), some hospitals clearly 
have a better success rate than others, even if the patients and procedures are comparable.
Possible Explanations:
Researchers have identified two possible explanations for this event:
One possible explanation is that successful hospitals have attracted surgeons and surgical nurses 
who are especially skilled and well educated.
Another possible explanation is that in successful hospitals each surgeon works with a 
particular group of surgical nurses, so that surgeon and nurses learn to work together as a 
standard team.
Now that you’ve thought about the possible explanations, please rate how convincing each one is.
How convincing is the skilled and well educated explanation?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
not at all      as convincing completely
convincing                as not convincing
Please tell me why you chose this rating.
How convincing is the together as a standard team explanation?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
not at all      as convincing completely
convincing                as not convincing
Please tell me why you chose this rating.
34Researchers have not yet had a chance to search for any additional information.
Sometimes information makes you want to change your rating; sometimes it makes you want to keep it 
the same. Now that you've heard about the additional information, do you want to change your ratings 
of either explanation or keep them the same?
Do you want to change your rating of the skilled and well educated explanation or keep it the same?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
not at all      as convincing completely
convincing                as not convincing
Please tell me why you chose this rating.
Do you want to change your rating of the together as a standard team explanation or keep it the same?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
not at all      as convincing completely
convincing                as not convincing
Please tell me why you chose this rating.
35 
More recently, researchers have found some additional information: 
Some of the hospitals with the worst success rates have poor success rates  even when 
they recruit especially skilled surgeons from other high performing hospitals.
In light of this information, do you want to change your rating of the skilled and well educated 
explanation or keep it the same?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
not at all      as convincing completely
convincing                as not convincing
Please tell me why you chose this rating.
Do you want to change your rating of the together as a standard team explanation or keep it the same?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
not at all      as convincing completely
convincing                as not convincing
Please tell me why you chose this rating.
If you had to select one explanation as the more convincing, which would it be:
skilled and well educated together as a standard team
Please tell me why you chose this explanation.
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